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THE "PRICE REVOLUTION" IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
AT THE END OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
The "price revolution", this "unique economic phenomenon in the early period 
of the world market"1, and its various forms of manifestation — the depreciation 
and devaluation of money, the rapid increase — appeared and developed not only 
in Europe but also in other areas, such as the Ottoman Empire and Persia.2 The 
present paper attempts to examine the Turkish price revolution in the period 
before the early 17th century (1606). 
Among the phenomena of the Ottoman price revolution, the process of the depre-
ciation of coins, primarily that of the ak<je (asper) should be mentioned in the first 
place. The monetary affairs of the Ottoman Empire were founded on a silver based 
monetary system, whose fundamental unit was the silver ak$e3. Other silver and 
gold coins of greater value, of both foreign and home origin, were of course also in 
circulation, such as the para, piastre, and the altun. The term bimetallism, however, 
could be applied to the economic-monetary life of the Empire only in a rather 
limited sense: the akqe was used mainly within the Empire, while the coins of 
greater value circulated in the international trade.4 The inflation of the akge was 
negligible in the first half of the 16th century, its value rate to the gold coin (altun) 
hardly changing at all. The exchange rate between 1491 and 1516 was usually 52 
ak^e to the altun, rising to 55 between 1517 and 1549, and to 60 between 1550 and 
1566.5 After the death of Soliman, on the succession of Selim II (1566), the 
government reduced the silver content of the akge (from 0.731 gms to 0.682 gms), 
but tried to keep its official rate of exchange the same.6 Nevertheless, the ak^e 
immediately began losing its value, and its "market price" went down. In 1574, 
Sultan Murad III sent a ferman to Palestine to the effect that one gold piece should 
be exchanged for 40 paras (80 ak^e) in the province. The decree also mentions the 
exchange rate in Istanbul, which was 35 para (70 ak§e) to the altun.7 No doubt, the 
exchange rate in Palestine better reflected the extent of the inflation of the ak^e 
than that in Istanbul, since the government was able to enforce its regulations more 
effectively in the capital. The market value of the gold piece moved between 80 and 
100 ak^e during the same period.8 
The depreciation of the akqe continued in the 1580s, during the war with 
Persia (1578 — 1590). Therefore, the government issued a decree between 1584 and 
1586 which devaluated the chief means of paying. The silver content of the new 
coin was reduced to nearly half of that of the earlier (0.384 gms), and 120 new ak^e 
was to be had for the altun.9 The effectiveness of this measure can be inferred from 
a ferman sent to Aleppo in 1588, according to which 120 ak^e was had for one altun 
in Istanbul, and which also prohibited more than 120 akge to be had for one gold 
piece in Aleppo. The Sultanic ferman also mentions two other silver coins besides 
the ak^e: the kurus (piastre), worth 80 ak^e, and the padisahi, worth 8 ak^e.10 It 
appears from the ferman that the inflation was more or less checked in the central 
regions of the Empire; it was more difficult, however, to enforce the regulations 
fixing the official exchange rate in the provinces. In 1589 — 90 the government drew 
the old coins from circulation and issued new pieces to establish monetary 
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stability.11 The "market price" of the akçe, nevertheless, continued to tend to be 
lower than its official exchange rate. From a ferman to the Governor of Adana, in 
1591 — 92, it transpires that in defiance of the decree — which set the rate of the 
akçe at 120 to the altun and 70 to the kurus — the altun was had for 130, and the 
kurus for 80 akçe.12 The 1594 — 95 ferman to Anatolia yields the information that 
the province had been drained of the more valuable coins (altun, piastre), and that 
the akçe was extensively forged; 18—19 akçe pieces were struck from one dirhem 
(3.2 gms) silver. According to the decree, the rate was 135 akçe per altun and 85 
akçe per piastre. The ferman limited the number of akçes to be struck from one 
dirhem to 8, and strictly forbade the selling of altun and piastre for more than the 
official exchange rate. Centrally issued measures, however, could not stop the 
process of the depreciation of the akçe. According to Sanderson, the English 
ambassador in Istanbul, the exchange rate between March and September, 1599, 
was 140 akçe to the gold ducat, and after September it went up to 160.14 The 
preamble to the price regulations of November 15,1600 (Narh Defteri) says that the 
value of the akçe had decreased to the extent that 180 pieces are had for one altun. 
The inflated akçe was drawn in again, and new coins issued. Although the silver 
content of the new akçe was lower (0.323 gms), the official exchange rate was set at 
120 akçe per altun. The Narh Defteri intended to raise the value of the akçe 
together with that of silver, and to stabilize the exchange rate at the 1584 — 86 level. 
To this end, the value of the money was raised 33% with the prices simultaneously 
lowered to the same extent.15 For a long time after that, till 1618 —19, the value and 
the silver content of the akçe remained essentially unchanged. 
Considering in itself, for the time being, the depreciation of the akçe, without 
regard to the raises of the market prices, it transpires that, between 1566 and 1600, 
the value of the akçe, in relation to gold, sank to its half in the official exchange 
rate (from 60 to 120), even, occasionally, in the free market, to its third (from 60 to 
180). In other words, during the period under consideration, the akçe underwent a 
200% and/or 300% inflation (accordingly, the value of the altun going up 
proportionately). The silver content of the akçe fell to somewhat lower than its 
original half (from 0.731 to 0.323 gms) during the period under discussion. The 
changes of the silver content and the exchange rate of the altun and akçe thus 
corresponded to one another. The government — as indicated by the devaluation in 
1584 — 86 and the regulations in 1600 — decreased the precious metal content of 
the akçe in a somewhat greater proportion than it did its exchange rate to the altun. 
The free market exchange rate of the akçe, on the other hand, usually fell lower 
than its silver decreased. 
One of thé important characteristics of the "price revolution" is the drariiatic 
rise of the prices of various products. This is, naturally, related to the fact that the 
value of the universal equivalent, the akçe, decreased. Not unlike in Europe, it was 
chiefly the prices of agricultural products that went up significantly. An attempt is 
made below to analyse the changes in the prices of these products. One of the 
reasons to do so is that it is about these products that we have the greatest quantity 
of the kind of data that allows the drawing of certain conclusions. On the other 
hand, this group of commodities is most representative of the Turkish price 
revolution, the economy of the Ottoman Empire being overwhelmingly agrarian in 
character (the weight and significance of urban guild-type industries being much 
less than that of agriculture). 
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The prices of grain rose significantly during the period between the end of the 
15th and the beginning of the 17th centuries. The price paid for 1 kile (25.7 kgs) of 
grain in Istanbul was about 13 ak§e in 1489-90, 23 akqe in 1585-86, and 71 ak^e 
in 1605-06.1 6 At the same time, in the district around Edirne 1 kile of grain cost 
something like 6 - 1 0 akqe between 1540-55, wavered between 9 - 2 0 ak^e after 
1566, and rose to 4 0 - 6 5 akqe between 1597-1607. In Bursa, on the other hand, 
the price of grain increased only 2 - 3 ak qe per kile (from 4 - 5 to 7) between 
1539-1564, while it went over 52 akqe in 1617.17The years between 1550 and 1600 
saw grain prices quintuple in Ankara, and decuple along the Aegeian coast.18 
The price of rice also went up high. In 1489 - 90 it was sold for only 16 akge per 
kile in Istanbul, in 1585-86 it cost about twice as much, that is 33 ak^e, and in 
1600, before the Narh Defteri, you had to pay 56 ak^e for it. The regulation set its 
price at 39 ak^e, but by 1604 - 05 it had shot up again to 60 akqe.19 
As regards the changes in the price of butter, it appears that the market price 
of 6 ak^e in 1490 doubled by 1585 to 12 ak qe. Before 1600, 1 okka (1.285 kgs) of 
butter cost 26 ak^e, to be reduced to 19 ak^e by the price regulations.20 The Narh 
Defteri cannot have produced enduring results in the case of butter, either, since 
according to data from the territory of Hungary under Turkish occupation, it cost 
25 ak qe already in 1601.21 
Honey was sold in Istanbul at about 4 ak^e per okka in 1489-90, and about 9 
ak^e in 1585 — 86. According to the regulations, before 1600 one could occasionally 
be charged as much as 20 ak^e for 1 okka of honey, and the decree set the new price 
at 13 ak^e. This, by 1604 - 05, had risen to 18 akge.22 
Flour cost 18 akqe in 1489-90, and 25 akqe in 1585-86. Before 1600 the 
price of 1 kile of flour was as high as 120 ak^e. The regulation set the new price at 
80, 75, and 50 ak^e depending on the quality of the flour. In 1604-05 flour still 
cost 75 ak^e, i.e. it had remained at the 1600 price level.23 
Lamb cost one and a half ak qe per okka in 1489 — 90, going up to 3 akqe by 
1585 - 86.24 According to data from Turk-occupied Hungary, it had climbed to 6 - 9 
ak qe by 1590-94.2 5 Before the decree of 1600, the price of lamb was often as high 
as 20 ak^e to the okka, which the regulation lowered to 13 ak^e. In 1604-05 lamb 
was even cheaper, lOak^e.26 
The six commodities considered above seem to be well representative of the 
tendency of rising prices of agrarian products.27 According to the available data, 
prices, compared to those at the end of the 15th century, rose slowly, moderately 
before 1585, the pace of increase gathering speed significantly between 1585 and 1600. 
According to Barkan, who regards the prices of the year 1490 as 100%, by 1585 the 
price index had risen to 182% expressed in ak$e, and to 162% expressed in real (the 
silver content of the ak$e). By 1588-89 the former had rocketed to 365%, while 
the latter had risen only to 182%. The increase of the price index slowed down 
somewhat between 1589 and 1596, but the akqe-index still reached 532%, and the 
real-index 266%. In 1600, the Narh Defteri resulted in the decrease of the two 
indexes to 418% and 209%, respectively. Before long, however, new increase 
followed, the ak^e-index reaching 630%, which can be regarded as the top, and the 
real-index staying a little below that of the year 1596 (265%).28 The two decades 
between 1585 and 1606 saw the price index of agrarian products expressed in ak qe 
undergo a 3.4-fold, and the real-index a 1.6-fold, increase. Naturally, there is a 
considerable divergence between the various products, since the prices of lamb and 
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flour sextupled and quintupled (before 1600), while grain price trebled, butter, 
honey, and rice prices doubled only. The rapid, overall rises of prices were 
definitely preceded by the gradual (after 1566), and the dramatic (from 1584) 
devalution of the ak$e. As it has been mentioned above, the official exchange rate 
and the silver content of the ak^e sank only to its half, its free market price at most 
to its third betwen the years 1566 and 1606. While the official exchange rate of the 
akqe remained essentially unchanged between 1584 and 1600, and its free market price 
decreased also only 60— 70%, during the same period of time the average price increase 
of agrarian products was over 300%. 
A number of explanations have been put forward about the possible causes of 
both the European and the Ottoman "price revolution". Traditional monetary 
theory attributes the inflation to the massive inflow of American precious metal 
(chiefly silver) into Europe, which assumed gradually larger proportions after 1560, 
topping around the turn of the century.29 One obvious handicap of the monetary 
theory is that it fails to answer the question why the prices increased in differring 
degrees. It was, to wit, the agrarian prices, and, within them, the grain prices that 
increased most spectacularly (at the average of between four and sixfold). The 
prices of industrial products increased less dramatically (falling short of even a 
threefold rise), and wage increases lagged even behind the latter.30 The 
demographic theory tends to lay the "price revolution" at the door of the growth of 
population. Researches have revealed that the population of Europe increased 
about 30 million in 150 years (1450-1600). Agricultural technology, however, 
could not keep pace with this relatively very significant growth of population, hence 
grain prices — being those of vital commodities — went up to greater extents than 
industrial prices.31 The next theory regards the price revolution as the sign, and the 
consequence, of a change in economic structure. The scholars who put forward this 
theory have pointed out that the industrial, urban population of Western Europe 
grew faster than the agriculture was able to provide them with surplus, and it was 
this that caused the change in the price structure. West European inflation then, 
"through the channels of international commerce ... spread to Southeastern 
Europe, and was, in the beginning, even favourable to the interests of the region."32 
The West European market for agricultural products, and the high prices of 
agriculture instigated the development of agricultural commodity production in the 
East European region, and that finally lead to the development of the system of the 
so called second serfdom (Zweite Leibeigenschaft), based on forced labour. 
The inquiries into the price revolution of the Ottoman Empire are, no doubt, 
based on the theories that explain the analogus phenomena in Europe. One of the 
main types of hypotheses attributes the inflation to the ingress of economic-
commercial processes outside the Ottoman Empire; the other basic type regards the 
price revolution rather as the consequence of changes within the Empire. There is 
also a wide-spread pragmatic method, which explains the radical price rises in terms 
of the joint effect of several factors. 
According to the most popular explanation, the main cause behind the 
Ottoman "price revolution" was the cheap silver from Peru flowing into Europe 
since the 1580s, resulting in a significant inflation, and this European inflation 
spreading to the Turkish Empire through the channels of commerce.33 It must be 
remembered that, due to the effect of Mexican silver, prices in Europe had been 
growing since the 1550s, and a slow rising of prices can be discerned to have been 
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going on in the Ottoman Empire as well.34 Adherents of this view also hold that the 
Turkish price revolution unfolding after the 1580s was also helped on by the price 
of gold, lower that in Europe, which caused the Ottoman Empire, as it were, to be 
flooded by European silver coins. In 1584, one of the most important items 
imported to the Empire from Europe was the silver real, boxfuls of it.35 The influx 
of silver in the form of coins was also made easy by the "free trade" economic policy 
of the Turkish Empire, related to the fact that the main goal of the government was 
to secure a steady supply of necessary commodities and the importation of those in 
short supply. Thus it was only the exportation of commodities essential in providing 
for the population (e.g. that of grain) that was impeded, while imports were not 
restricted in any way whatsoever. The Ottoman state was based on a subsistence 
economy, struggling with a chronic shortage of precious metals, so the government 
encouraged the import of silver. On the whole, the Ottoman economic policy was 
based on bullionist views, regarding the active foreign trade balance exclusively in 
terms of the quantity of specie amassed in the vaults of the treasury.36 
The other theory tracing the Ottoman price revolution to external causes 
emphasizes the importance of Western European demand for agricultural products, 
and the high prices it led to.Both Barkan and Cook have observed that to no avail 
did the Turkish government prohibit the exportation of raw materials and food 
essential for the internal supply of the Empire, since the promise of big profits led 
to smuggling.37 Cook's explanation as regards this phenomenon, namely that the 
price of grains on the coast of the Aegean Sea was twice as high as in Anatolia, is 
that it was primarily those regions of the Empire with good transportation facilities 
that could respond to the Western demand.38 Barkan is of the opinion that the 
penetration of the so called Atlantic economy into the closed Ottoman economic 
system, on account of the differences between their price systems, resulted in the 
latter beginning to develop into an agrarian system producing for the market.39 
Shaw similarly stresses the point that economically developing and growing 
Europe, on account of the resulting boom in raw materials, was able, with its high 
prices, to draw these from the closed Ottoman economy.40 Others have also pointed 
out that the Ottoman Empire was transforming towards the end of the 16th 
century, its medieval subsistence economy metamorphosing into a more developed 
market economy. The "price revolution" is believed to have played an important 
role in this development, speeding up, like a catalyst, its inner processes.41 
Of the internal factors, the significance of demographic changes within the 
Empire have been emphasized. Braudel has hypothesized a significant growth of 
population in the Mediterranaeum including the Turkish Empire, which resulted, 
on the one hand, in the increasing demand by the Western Mediterranaeum, and 
on the other, in the decline of the grain-exporting capacity of the Eastern 
Mediterranaeum (i.e. the Ottoman Empire). Ha dates the boom in grain and the 
large-scale Turkish grain exports to the years between 1548 and 1564. Barkan also 
accepts the idea of a significant demographic growth in the 16th century. On the 
ground of surveys between 1520 — 30, and between 1570—80, he postulates a 
growth of 71% in Rumelia, and 55% in Anatolia. In his opinion, based on the 
sources, mainly the urban population grew in this period; nearly 90% in 40—50 
years. At the same time he raises the question about the possibility of a mere 
"redistribution" of the population having taken place within the framework of an 
increasing urbanisation and a strengthening depopulation in the rural areas.43 
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According to a survey, this period saw a 40% and an 80% increase of the population 
in the villages and in the towns, respectively, of the Ottoman Empire. Cook has 
questioned Braudel's thesis that Turkish grain exports decreased after the 1560s 
because of the increasing internal demand. He believes, on the contrary, that large 
scale grain smuggling, that is, a more intensive — albeit illegal — grain trade, was 
carried on between 1570 and 1590 than previously. He generally accepts the view 
that the population of the Ottoman Empire grew significantly between 1450 and 
1575, justified by the general tendency of the peasant holdings to be subdivided. He 
voices serious doubts, however, regarding the continuous growth of the population, 
especially in the last two decades of the century.45 More recent studies, while 
confirming demographic growth between 1547-48 and 1569 — 70, bring forth 
evidence to the decrease of population between 1570 and 1613, particularly in the 
villages.46 
Most recently, Gerber Haim has claimed that the causes of the monetary-
financial crisis of the Ottoman Empire, in addition to demographic growth and the 
spreading of money economy, also include the fact that the government, in its 
struggle to defeat the increasing deficit of the treasury, resorted to devaluation. By 
reducing the value of the ak$e, the government tried to have the growing body of 
mercenaries and the population in general pay for the deficit. Haim refuses to 
accept the influx of silver as the main cause of the inflation. He believes the silver 
imported from Europe did not remain in the Empire but was passed on and ended 
up in Persia, the Turks being able to pay for Persian silk only in specie.47 According 
to the pragmatic Parry, the price revolution should be attributed rather to the joint 
effects of various causes than to one single factor. He lists the inflow of silver, the 
growth of military expenditure related to the increase of the armed forces, and the 
significant growth of the population as the factors that led to the inflation.48 Barkan 
postulates the following four components of the "price revolution": the inter-
national movement of precious metals; changes (disadvantageous for the Ottoman 
Empire) in commerce; immense military and war expenditure; and the dramatic 
growth of population.49 
Having thus surveyed the views current in the literature on the subject, we 
should now formulate our own opinion about the causes of the Ottoman "price 
revolution". The inflation in Western Europe would certainly seem to have played a 
decisive role, making itself felt in the Turkish Empire through the channels of the 
Levantine trade, on the one hand, and, on the other, through the illegal trade (i.e. 
smuggling) in the Mediterranaeum. Western Europe "infected" the economy of the 
Empire with great quantities of inflated silver coins. Haim's claim that the trade 
with Persia would have cleaned the Ottoman Empire of the silver from Europe has 
not been sufficiently substantiated. In addition to its silver, the influence of Europe 
also worked through its high agrarian prices, which forced, as it were, exports of 
important raw materials and foodstuffs from the Empire. That is to say, the more 
developed Western European economic structure made its higher speed of development 
felt, and the Ottoman agrarian system, being much weaker, was able to keep up with 
it only partially, and at the cost of enormous efforts. Western Europe, in fact, made 
its impact on the economy of the Turkish Empire with its radically changed price 
structure, which reflected its own internal development, and effected there changes, 
which were also radical but corresponded to the internal structure of the Empire. 
To summarise, the Western European export of specie and the export of Turkish 
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agrarian products — the exchange of two, different types of commodities — would 
seem to have been a fundamentally important cause of the Ottoman price 
revolution. 
There is no doubt, however, that internal factors also played a major role in the 
inflation. What transpires from the studies at this stage is that the demographic 
growth stopped in the decade preceding the price revolution, and the last two 
decades of the 16th century through the beginning of the 17th are rather marked by 
the decrease of population. Thus the increase of the internal demand for agrarian 
products just during the critical period can be hypothesized only if the demographic 
structure had also changed. This seems very likely, since during the period of 
demographic growth (1540-1570) the urban population grew faster than the rural, 
and even during the time of the decrease (1570 — 1613) towns were less affected 
than villages.50 Owing to the rising taxes, many peasants moved to the towns leaving 
their lands. The depopulation of villages, in direct proportion to the extent of the 
inflation, assumed larger and larger dimensions towards the end of the 16th 
century. The growth of the urban population (including the members of the paid 
military, the bureaucracy, the imperial household, etc.), that is of the consumer 
classes, on the one hand, and the decrease of the proportion of the rural agrarian 
producers, on the other, could effect the increase of the internal demand for agrarian 
products, thus pushing up their prices. In addition to the external demand from 
Western Europe, the internal demand of the towns of the Ottoman Empire could also 
be an important factor of the price revolution.51 
Factors related to the treasury and the administration of public revenues should 
also be considered besides the deeper, economic causes of the "price revolution". 
During Soliman's reign the balance of the budget was to a considerable extent (cc. 
70 million ak^e) to the favour of the revenues as opposed to expenditure. Towards 
the end of his life, however, a small deficit (cc. 6 million ak^e) appeared indicating 
the existence of economic and financial difficulties in the Ottoman Empire.52 After 
the Persian wars, in 1591, the revenues were about one third less than the 
expenditure (a deficit of cc. 70 million akce), the deficit growing to catastrophic 
proportions in 1597 (cc. 600 million ak^e). The deficit of the treasury would seem 
to confirm the phenomenon observed in connection with the agrarian prices; the 
inflation, the monetary crisis hit the bottom in the late 1590s. One of the causes of the 
growing deficit in the budget was the enormous cost of the two prolonged military 
entanglements at the end of the century, the Persian war (1578 — 1590) and the 
Fifteen Years' War (1593 —1606).54 Military spending was significantly enhanced 
by a process, rather general in the 16th century; the growth of the number and the 
proportion of the mercenary troops within the army. At the beginning of Soliman's 
reign, in 1527, the total number of the janissaries, and the sipahis of the Porte was 
about 13.000; in 1567 it was over 21.000, in 1582 over 27.000, and in 1609 the 
janissaries alone numbered 37.000.55 This swelling of the mercenaries of the Porte 
put the government in a difficult position, and several times during the inflationary 
period it logged behind with the payment due at every quarter (ulufe).56 In order to 
eliminate the deficit, to pay the mercenaries, and to continue the prolonged wars 
effectively, the government devaluated the ak$e (1584) and paid the soldiers with 
the new coins, and introduced other measures as well (raised taxes, gave the vacant 
timars to tax-farmers, etc.)57 The devalution of the ak$e accelerated the inflation. 
The ak?e, rapidly losing its value, was extensively forged, thus becoming more and 
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more a copper piece. People wanted to get rid of the depreciating coins, thus 
speeding up their "circulation". The inflation of the akqe was added to the inflation of 
silver ingressing from Western Europe, the two processes strengthening one another. 
The internal and external factors together led to the — in this age unusual — rise of 
agrarian prices between 1580 and 1606. 
The "price revolution" affected the economic and social system of the Ottoman 
Empire, causing fundamental changes in its "classical" Turkish system of 
institutions. The inflation contributed to the disintegration of the timar-system and 
the servant system (devshirme). 
Service estates or income estates ( = timar) meant that their holders, the 
sipahis, were granted the right of collecting taxes and duties in lieu of payment, and 
were in turn obliged to provide military service; they were expected to march to war 
with a number of troops depending on the size of their incomes. As a result of the 
agrarian boom and the rise of prices, the value of the duties the peasants (reayas) 
paid in specie was losing its value, and mainly the small holder sipahis were, 
therefore, less and less able and willing to fulfil their military obligations. The 
government occasionally responded drastically to the sipahis' absence from military 
campaigns.58 The high agrarian prices urged the sipahis to settle down and regard 
their service holdings as hereditary possessions ("feudum"). Their number, at the 
same time, was dramatically decreasing,59 and they sank to a lower level as a class, 
though not disappearing completely. According to Barkan, "the first victim of the 
widespread inflation was the semi-feudal military ... cavalry".60 The government 
was also responsible for the process of the sipahis' being driven into the 
background. This feudal cavalry, with its obsolete weaponry and tactics could not 
keep up with the general military development, and thus in the wars at the end of 
the century a gradually increasing role was played by the growing paid troops of the 
Porte Janissaries, sipahis of the Porte), and other mercenary elements (sekban, 
sarija).61 The government also contributed to the sipahis' losing weight by refusing 
to distribute the vacant timars, and - as an effort to raise the revenues of the 
treasury - giving them to tax-farmers, instead. A portion of the timar estates was 
acquired or bought by court favourites, usurers, tax-farmers, and janissaries. 
Significant concentration of estates can also be perceived in this period, in some 
cases more than fifty timars owned by one person.62 The class taking the place of 
the sipahis was far from being homogenous. Obviously, the new owners would not 
even hear of the military obligations that previously had gone with the timars, 
which slowly began to turn into hereditary estates. The process was strengthened by 
the appearance of the giftlik, formed on some of the timars, and resembling the 
Eastern European manorial estate. Riding on the wave of the agrarian boom, the 
Siftliks appeared at the end of the 16th century, mainly in the fertile plains, 
spreading extensively, however, rather in the 17 - 18th centuries.63 It was also due 
to the effect of the "price revolution" that the wealthy elements of the Ottoman 
Empire, having joined the trade of commodities,64 started to get involved in 
commodity production, as well. 
In addition to the timar system, the devshirme system also began to disinteg-
rate. The mercenaries of the Porte (kapi kulu), on account of the depreciation of 
their pay, began to get involved in trade and crafts. Since the janissaries were 
exempt from taxes, other elements also tried to avail themselves of this privilege by 
having themselves included on the paylist, without fulfilling the military obligations 
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that would have to go with it.65 The infiltration of merchants and artisans among 
the mercenaries of the Porte was rendered easier by that the sons of the janissaries 
— regarded by the law as Moslim — were admitted into the mercenary units first 
(from 1574) according to a quota, and later the "status" of janissary became 
generally hereditary.66 The swelling up of the mercenary units of the Porte had two 
serious consequences. One was that discipline deteriorated to incredible extents, 
and the other that this military class, increasingly merging with merchant and 
artisan elements, and more and more frequently used in factional struggles, was 
gaining political weight in Istanbul. The inflation led to mutinies among the kapi 
kulu troops (e.g. in 1592, 1600, 1603), which the government could suppress only 
with difficulties.67 The growing number of mercenaries made devshirme, the "child-
tax", unnecessary, and in the 17th century it disappeared completely. 
The price revolution had serious consequences in the villages as well. Due to 
the inflation, the depreciation of the akge, the government raised the taxes. While 
in the early 16th century the jizye was only 40 akge, at the end of the century it was 
240 ak§e. The permanent wars made the extraordinary, so-called avariz taxes, 
regular, annual taxes to be paid in money.68 The abuses of tax-farmers rendered the 
peasants' condition more difficult and caused them to leave their lands for the 
towns or organize themselves into landless, roaming, and plundering bands 
(levend). The government proposed to solve the problem posed by the levends with 
its settlement policy (e.g. when Cyprus was taken in 1571, settlers were sent there), 
and/or by turning these bands into military (sekban, sarija) units. The so-called 
jelali uprisings at the end of the 16th century, in which the levends and the small 
holder sipahis joined forces against the central government supporting the tax-
farmers, were suppressed with difficulties (between 1596 and 1610).69 
The Ottoman "price revolution" was significant in several respect. It was, on the 
one hand, an important factor in the economico-monetary, social, political, and 
spiritual crisis of the Ottoman Empire.70 During the 17th century this crisis evolved 
into a prolonged process of decline. The Ottoman Empire found itself on the 
periphery of the just emerging world economy, more and more subordinated to 
Western Europe, the new center. However, the price revolution, besides its 
damaging consequencies, resulted in promising changes as well. Commodity produc-
tion and money economy gained strength, and although this process led to the 
disintegration of what was basically a subsistence economy, and of the traditional, 
oriental type society with its institutional system, it can still be regarded as basically 
beneficial. The elements that rode the crest of the agrarian boom accumulated 
considerable amounts of capital, yet this could not trigger off a Western European 
style capitalization process. 1 The main reason for that seems to have been that the 
advantageous agrarian prices drew the attention of the classes that grew rich on tax-
farming, usury, and commodity trade towards land. Industry, at the same time, did 
not promise similar profits, its guild structure also preventing the penetration of 
commercial capital. The two sides of the original accumulation of capital (the 
accumulation of capital, and the accumulation of labour deprived of the means of 
production in the towns) could not be joinedP The turn of the capital towards 
agriculture resulted in the unfolding of a re-feudalization tendency similar to that in 
Eastern Europe 
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Tóth Sándor László 
A Z „ÁRFORRADALOM" A 16. SZÁZAD VÉGI OSZMÁN BIRODALOMBAN 
(Rezümé) 
Az oszmán „árforradalom" jelenségei között a szerző elemzi az ezüst akcse 
értékcsökkenésének folyamatát. Megállapítása szerint 1566 és 1600 között az akcse 
ezüsttartalma s hivatalos árfolyama felére, szabadpiaci értéke harmadára csökkent. 
Ugyanakkor az agrárértékek árai ugrásszerűen növekedtek az 1585 — 1606 közötti 
két évtizedben, az átlagos áremelkedés meghaladta a 300%-ot is. 
A szerző részletesen foglalkozik az oszmán árforradalmat külső (az Európából 
beáramló ezüst, a nyugat-európai kereslet az agrártermékek iránt) és belső 
(népesség növekedés, a kormányzat devalvációs politikája) tényezőkkel, illetve ezek 
együttes hatásával magyarázható hipotézisekkel. A szerző véleménye szerint a 
török árforradalomban döntő szerepe volt a nyugateurópai inflációnak, amely az 
inflálódott európai ezüstpénzek bevitelén és a magas áron megvásárolt török agrár-
termékek kivitelén keresztül „gyűrűzött be". Bár a kritikus 16. század végi és 17. 
század eleji időszakban a török birodalom népessége inkább csökkent; a demográ-
fiai struktúra úgy rendeződött át, hogy a városi fogyasztói réteg aránya növekedett, 
az agrártermelők aránya pedig csökkent. így a nyugat-európai külső kereslet 
mellett a belső kereslet is fokozódott az agrártermékek iránt, felhajtva így azok 
árát. Az árforradalomnak voltak államháztartással összefüggő tényezői is. 
Szulejmán halálától a 16. század végéig egyre nagyobb kincstári deficit jelentkezett. 
Ennek okai: a századvég két elhúzódó háborúja, s a fizetett zsoldos csapatok létszá-
mának ugrásszerű emelkedése. A deficit csökkentése céljából folyamodott a 
kormányzat 1584 — 86 között az akcse devalválásához, majd 1600-ban az akcse 
stabilizálása mellett a piaci árakat is csökkentette. A központi intézkedések az 
akcse inflációjához vezettek, amely a nyugat-európai ezüstinflációhoz járult, s e két 
inflációs tényező egymást erősítette. 
A szerző az „árforradalom" következményeként említi a klasszikus oszmán 
intézményrendszer két fontos részének; a timárrendszernek (szpáhi-rendszernek) 
és a szolgarendszernek (devsirme) rohamos felbomlását, valamint a falvak rohamos 
elnéptelenedését (depopuláció), s a századvégi dzseláli felkeléseket. 
Az „árforradalom" az oszmán birodalom hanyatlásba torkolló válságának egyik 
fontos oka volt, ugyanakkor erősödött az árutermelés és a pénzgazdálkodás. 
Jelentős tőkefelhalmozódás is végbement, az agrárkonjunktúra és az ipar gyenge-
sége miatt azonban a nyugat-európai kapitalizációs tendencia helyett a kelet-
európaihoz hasonló refeudalizációs tendencia bontakozott ki. 
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